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Abstract
Most people are risk-averse (risk-seeking) when they expect to gain (lose).
Based on a generalization of “expected utility theory” which takes this into
account, we introduce an automaton mimicking the dynamics of economic
operations. Each operator is characterized by a parameter q which gauges
people’s attitude under risky choices; this index q is in fact the entropic one
which plays a central role in nonextensive statistical mechanics. Different
long term patterns of average asset redistribution are observed according to
the distribution of parameter q (chosen once for ever for each operator) and
the rules (e.g., the probabilities involved in the gamble and the indebtedness
restrictions) governing the values that are exchanged in the transactions. An-
alytical and numerical results are discussed in terms of how the sensitivity to
risk affects the dynamics of economic transactions.
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People are sensitive to risk, a characteristic also observed in animals such as rats, birds
and honeybees [1]. The usual preference for a sure choice over an alternative of equally
or even more favorable expected value is called risk aversion. Actually, most people feel
aversion to risk when they expect, with moderate or high probability, to gain and attraction
to risk when they expect to lose. These tendencies are inverted for very low probabilities
[2]. Certainly, this pattern of attitudes affects most human decisions since chance factors
are always present, e.g., in medical strategies, in gambling or in economic transactions. In
particular, in the context of finances, the attitude of economic operators under risky choices
clearly is one of the main ingredients to be kept in mind for realistically modeling market
dynamics.
In economics, traditionally, the analysis of decision making under risk was treated
through the “expected utility theory” (EUT) [3], on the assumption that individuals make
rational choices. More precisely, the expected value E, corresponding to the prospect
P ≡ (x1, p1; . . . ; xn, pn) such that the outcome xi (gain if positive; loss if negative) oc-
curs with probability pi, is given by E(P) =
∑n
i=1 χ(xi) pi, where the weighting function
χ(xi) monotonically increases with xi. (Clearly, a statistically fair game corresponds to
χ(xi) = xi.) There are however aspects of risk sensitivity that are not adequately contem-
plated within EUT. Such features were exhibited, through experiments with hypothetical
choice problems, by Kahneman and Tversky [2]. They then proposed a generalization to
EUT equation within “prospect theory” (PT) [2]: E(P) =
∑n
i=1 χ(xi) Π(pi), where the
weighting function Π(pi) monotonically increases with pi. Its typical shape (correspond-
ing to the most frequent human attitude) is presented in Fig. 1, as sketched by Tver-
sky and collaborators [2,4] on the ground of experiments and observations. The weight
Π(p) is, basically, concave for low and convex for high probabilities, with Π(0) = 0 and
Π(1) = 1. Moreover, most individuals satisfy (i) Π(p) + Π(1 − p) ≤ 1 (the equality holds
for p = 0, 1) (subcertainty), (ii) Π(p s)/Π(p) ≤ Π(p r s)/Π(p r) for 0 < p, r, s ≤ 1 (sub-
proportionality), (iii) Π(p) < (>)p for high (low) probabilities (under(over)weighting), and,
(iv) for very low probabilities, Π(p r) > rΠ(p) for 0 < r < 1 (subadditivity). The fol-
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lowing functional forms have been proposed [5] in the context of nonextensive statistical
mechanics [6]: Π(p) = pq, (q ∈ ℜ) and Π(p) = pq/(pq + (1 − p)q), usually referred to as
escort probability. Other functional forms are also available in the literature [7], such as
Π(p) = pq/[pq + (1 − p)q]1/q and Π(p) = pq/[pq + A(1 − p)q], where A > 0. Clearly, A = 1
recovers the escort probability and for appropriate choices of (q, A), the latter expression can
satisfy all the properties detailed above. In all these cases, each individual is characterized
by a set of parameters which yields a particular Π(p) representing the subjective processing
that the individual makes of known probabilities p in a chance game.
More recently, PT was generalized [8] using a rank dependent or cumulative representa-
tion where the “decision weight” multiplying the value of each outcome is distinguished from
the probability weight. This interesting generalization is however irrelevant for the present
study. Indeed, we will deal here with simple prospects with a single positive outcome, hence
both versions coincide.
In the present work we investigate the consequences of risk averse attitudes in the dy-
namics of economic operations. In order to do so we apply methods of statistical physics.
This strategy has proved to be very useful in several previous works [9] (see also [10] for
general discussions on the application of statistical physics methods in economy). Here we
introduce an automaton simulating monetary transactions among operators with different
attitudes under risky choices. Elementary operations are of the standard type used in hy-
pothetical choice problems that exhibit risk aversion [2]. By following the time evolution of
the asset position of the operators, it will be possible to conclude on the consequences of
each particular attitude.
We will restrict our study to the regime of moderate and high probabilities where most
people are risk averse for gains. In this regime, human behavior can be satisfactorily de-
scribed by the weighting function Π(p) = pq. This expression, which has a simpler form
than other weights describing the full domain, is the one adopted in the present work. Fur-
thermore, since we will focus on probabilistic factors, we assume that all individuals have
the simplest utility function, namely χ(x) = x. Adopting these choices and, additionally,
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assuming that the probability weight Π(p) is the same for gains and losses, a unique pa-
rameter (q) characterizes each individual according to the attitude under risky choices. An
ideally rational individual has q = 1 while most individuals “feel” probabilities with q > 1.
The present automaton simulates monetary transactions amongN operators. We assume
for simplicity that in each elementary transaction two agents participate. One of them
proposes to the other a choice between two alternative ways of either paying money or of
receiving money. As an illustration of the former case, the proponent typically asks: “What
do you prefer: to receive a certain quantity X or to play a game where you receive Y with
probability P , such that PY = X , and nothing with probability 1 − P ?”. More precisely,
the alternative choices are: 1) a certain prospect P = (±αS, 1), with α > 0, and 2) a risky
one P = (±S, P ; 0, 1 − P ), where S is a positive quota and the +/− apply to the cases
when the proponent receives/pays. The value of α depends on the psychological factors q
of both operators in a way that will be defined below for each one of the models conceived.
The also possible case where the choice is between a fixed certain prospect P = (±S, 1)
and a variable risky one P = (±αS, P ; 0, 1 − P ) will not be analyzed here since it yields
quite analogous results. Along the dynamics, the probability P and the quota S, the two
parameters characterizing the elementary operations, are kept fixed. Clearly, the present
games are not the kind of operations that actually occur in a financial market. However in
the sense of the theory of financial decisions, they illustrate the risk aversion phenomenon.
Let us consider N agents with values of q uniformly distributed in the interval [Q1, Q2].
For simplicity we take qk = Q1+(Q2−Q1)(k−1)/(N−1) with k = 1, . . . , N . Each operator
k has an initial amount of moneyMk(0). In each time step, a transaction between the agents
of a randomly chosen ordered pair (i,j) occurs. The exchanged quantity is taken positive if
the proponent (i) is the one who receives the money and negative otherwise. Whether the
exchanged quantity is positive (i receives the money) or negative (j receives the money), it
is randomly drawn at each step of the dynamics.
Restrictions on the level of indebtedness of the operators can be imposed. We consider
three cases (NR, OR and PR): In case NR, there are no restraints and operators can be
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indebted without limit; in OR, there are opportunistic restraints and agents can also operate
indefinitely except that they do not pay when they would have to do so if at a given step
of the dynamics their asset become less than a minimal quantity M∗ (i.e., operators can
become swindlers occasionally); finally, in PR, agents become permanently forbidden to trade
from the instant when their assets fall below the threshold M∗. This threshold introduces
nonlinearity into the problem.
For each one of these three cases, other variations (A, S and C) were considered following
different definitions of α: in A (alter-referential), operator i, the proponent, somehow knows
the psychology of j (qj); in S (self-referential), operator i ignores qj and hence attributes to
j her/his own value of q; finally, in C (consensual), operators i and j act by consensus.
In variations A and S, the proponent, i, will present, according to the hypothesis made
on the q of j (qhypj taken to be qj for model A and qi for model S), a certain alternative
which i considers the worst between the one which has the same standard expected value as
the game (±PS) and the one that i believes to have for j the same expectation as the game
(±P q
hyp
j S). This opportunistic behavior can be expressed through the factor α, as presented
below:
Case A: α = min(max){P, P qj} if i pays(takes).
Case S: α = min(max){P, P qi} if i pays(takes).
Note that, in a statistically fair game, it should be α = P so that both prospects (the
certain and the risky ones) would have the same standard expected value. On the other
hand, agent j will choose the risky prospect either 1) if P qj > α when i pays or 2) if P qj < α
when i takes or 3) in 50% of the cases if P qj = α.
Case C: In this instance, there is not a proponent and both players have a symmetric
role arriving to a consensus. Hence, let us consider without loss of generality, the case when
i pays and j takes. If qi < qj there is agreement for the risky alternative, otherwise, the
agreement is for the certain choice with α an intermediate value between P qi and P qj , for
instance, as we will adopt, α = (P qi + P qj)/2.
Combining all these possibilities, we have a total of nine models: (NR,A),
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(NR,S),. . .,(PR,C).
Let us discuss first the models of the type (NR,*), for which there is no indebtedness
restriction. The amount of money of operator i at time t, Mi(t), in average over a large
number of realizations (histories), is given by
Mi(t) = Mi(0) +
t
N
S Vi ∀i, t, (1)
where Vi =
1
N
∑
j(Gij−Gji), such that the Gmatrix has non negative elements. For instance,
for case (NR,C), explicitly one has
GCij =


1
2
(P qi + P qj) j < i ,
0 j = i ,
P j > i .
(2)
The continuum approximation of Vi for all models (NR,*), considering uniform distribu-
tion of parameter q in the interval [Q1, Q2], results
V (q) ≃
1
Q2 −Q1
×


1
4
(
(Q2 +Q1 − 2)P +
2P−PQ1−PQ2
lnP
+ (Q2 −Q1)(P − P
q)sign(1− q)
)
(A)
1
2
(1− q)P + 1
2
P q−P
lnP
− 1
2
(P − P q)×
{ (q −Q1) if q < 1
(q −Q2) otherwise
(S)
(Q2 +Q1 − 2q)(P −
1
2
P q) + 2P
q
−PQ1−PQ2
2 lnP
(C)
(3)
V (q) vs q for models (NR,*) is illustrated in Fig. 2. V (q) rules the average evolution of
assets, being
M(q, t) = M(q, 0) +
t
N
SV (q) ∀q, t. (4)
From Fig. 2a corresponding to a more realistic distribution of q than Fig. 2b (since about
75% of the people are risk averse when high probabilities are involved), note that for (NR,A)
(where the proponent knows the psychology of the other) the maximum emerges at q = 1 (the
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rational player) while for (NR,S) (where the proponent acts following the own psychology)
we observe the emergence of a minimum at q = 1 and of two maxima on both sides of q = 1
being the absolute maximum the one for q > 1 (agents who are conservative for gains).
Case (NR,C) (consensus) corresponds to an intermediate situation where the maximum
asset increase occurs for q above 1.
For models (OR,*) and (PR,*) the average time evolution of M is not linear with t. In
these cases, the evolution follows Eq. (1) (or its continuous version Eq. (4)) up to time τ
when some agent’s asset falls below the threshold M∗. In models (OR,*), from that instant
on, the discrete Markovian automaton can be described, in average, by
Mi(t+ 1) =Mi(t) +
S
N2
∑
j
(HjGij −HiGji) ∀i, t > τ, (5)
where Hk ≡ H(Mk(t) −M
∗) is a Heaviside function. Mi(t) evolves to a non trivial steady
state whose extrema coincid with those of Vi. This steady stateM
SS
k is approximately of the
form MSSK = a/(b+ V
max − Vk), ∀k, where a, b > 0. Its continuous version is the long time
solution of the nonlinear diffusion equation ∂tM(q, t) = ∂q(M(q, t)∂qV (q)) + a∂qq lnM(q, t).
In fact, (−V (q)) acts as the potential of an effective drift which rules the dynamics. In Fig.
3, M(q, t), averaged over several realizations, vs. q, is illustrated for models (OR,*). The
maxima of M , Mmax, and its corresponding q, qmax, are plotted as a function of time t in
Figs. 3b and 3c to control the stability of the resulting state. The plots are invariant when
all monetary amounts (i.e, Mo, M
∗ and S) are multiplied by a common factor. As either
M∗/Mo or S/Mo increase, the steady state broadens. Increasing S shortens the time scale
and increases the amplitude of fluctuations. Although in the example M(q, 0) = Mo, the
steady state does not depend on the initial distribution of money.
For models (PR,*), the dynamics follows a different evolution. M(q, t) evolves to a Dirac
δ function centered at q = 1 or at the boundary closer to q = 1 (see Fig. 4). As for the
(OR,*) models, the stability is controlled by watching Mmax and qmax vs t. Note that in
all cases qmax → 1, although for case (PR,S) the convergence is slower. Therefore, with this
kind of indebtedness restraint, the more rational operator wins at the long term. Here the
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final state does not depend on the distribution of q, which will just generate a different V (q),
as soon as it contains q = 1 (if not, the boundary closer to q = 1 wins). On the other hand,
the final state depends on the initial distribution of assets once some individuals may have
assets below the threshold and are forbidden to play from the beginning.
On average, the rational player (with q = 1) wins from every other (Guj − Gju ≥ 0, ∀j
and qu = 1). That is why with restraints of type PR such player is the long term winner.
Operators with extreme values of q are long term losers. With indebtedness restrictions of
kind PR, they have to abandon the game. With restrictions of kind OR (cheating is not
forbidden), they are allowed to remain in the game, but their assets keep fluctuating close to
the threshold M∗. A non trivial steady state appears in this case. Operators with qk a bit
above one (a bit risk averse for gains) lose from some neighbors but win more in the total
sum, i.e.,
∑
j(Gkj−Gjk) ≥ 0), as soon as those with extreme values of q remain in the game.
Consequently, the maximum of the steady state is located at q above one (primacy of the
conservatives). In case (OR,*) the initial distribution of parameter q will affect the form of
the function V and therefore the shape of the steady state governed by the effective potential
(−V ). On the other hand, the steady state does not depend on the initial distribution of
money.
In conclusion, the type of conditions limiting indebtedness are critical for defining the na-
ture of the long term evolution, i.e., existence or not of a nontrivial steady state. The details
of this steady state depend, among other factors, on the distribution of the parameter q of
the operators. One also observes that the final state is invariant under initial redistribution
of money. Paradoxically enough, some level of cheating avoids extreme wealth inequality
to become the stationary state. However, one must keep in mind that the distribution of q
is kept fixed along the dynamics and, therefore, the psychological effect of asset position is
not taken into account in the present model. Such dynamics would provide an improved,
more realistic model. In fact, a model which, in addition to this learning–from–experience
dynamics, would use a weight such as that of Fig. 1 simultaneously with an appropriate
nonlinear utility function, might very well constitute a quite realistic frame for taking into
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account the well known human risk aversion in the context of collective trading.
We thank R. Maynard for useful discussions at the preliminary stages of these ideas. We
acknowledge Brazilian agencies CNPq, FAPERJ and PRONEX for financial support.
CAPTIONS FOR FIGURES
Figure 1: Typical shape of the function pi(p). The dotted line corresponds to the usual
expectation value (EUT).
Figure 2: V (q) vs q, obtained from Eq. (3), for cases A, S and C and two different initial
distributions of parameter q: uniform in [0, 4] (a), and uniform in [0, 2] (b). Without debt
restraints V gives the average time evolution of assets: M(q, t)−M(q, 0) = StV (q)/N . Thin
lines correspond to the average over 104 numerical simulations with M(q, 0) = Mo = 1000,
N = 100, S = 10, P = 0.85 and t = 104.
Figure 3: Time evolution of assets with indebtedness restraints of kind (OR,*) (without
exclusion) with threshold M∗ = 100. (a) (M(q, t)−Mo)/Mo vs q at term t/N = 25000 when
the steady state is already attained, for cases A (black), S (dark gray) and C (light gray).
Lines correspond to simulations averaged on 2×103 experiments withM(q, 0) =Mo = 1000,
N = 40, S = 100 and P = 0.85. The plots do not depend on N and depend on (M∗,Mo)
only through their ratio. Increasing S shortens the time scale and increases fluctuation
amplitude. (b) M(qmax, t) vs t and (c) qmax vs t where qmax maximizes M(q, t). For case S,
both maxima are plotted.
Figure 4: Time evolution of assets with indebtedness restriction of kind (PR,*) (with
exclusion) with threshold M∗ = 100. (a) (M(q, t)−Mo)/Mo vs q at term t/N = 12500, for
cases A (black), S (dark gray) and C (light gray). Lines correspond to simulations averaged
on 103 experiments with M(q, 0) = Mo = 1000, N = 40, S = 10 and P = 0.85. (b)
M(qmax, t) vs t and (c) qmax vs t where qmax maximizes M(q, t). For case S, both maxima
are plotted.
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